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Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
decisions interpreting "trade or com-
merce" in the context of professional
practices.
The court noted that federal and
state court opinions drew a clear dis-
tinction between the business aspects of
professional practice, as opposed to the
actual or non-business aspects. The
United States Supreme Court declared
that setting a county-wide minimum
fee schedule for title examinations con-
stituted a business aspect of law and
was therefore subject to federal anti-
trust regulations. Conversely, an Illi-
nois state court held that the issue of
attorney malpractice was a non-busi-
ness aspect of the legal profession and
was thus not subject to regulation under
the Act. The Illinois court exempted
the actual practice of law from the
Act's coverage because, unlike other
commercial service industries, the prac-
tice of law was already subject to regu-
lation by governmental bodies and by
its own professional organizations.
Using this same line of reasoning,
the court deduced that the "actual prac-
tice of medicine" must likewise include
those aspects of the medical practice
which receive comprehensive training
or which the professions regulate them-
selves. However, unlike legal and
medical malpractice, the court noted
there were no professional or govern-
mental regulations for service contracts
between hospitals and clinics. There-
fore, the court determined that only the
actual practice of medicine, not the
business aspects of the profession, such
as a service contract between a hospital
and a clinic, escaped the Act's jurisdic-
tion.
The court found further support for
its conclusion regarding the meaning
of "trade or commerce" in the FTC
decisions. The court noted that accord-
ing to the Act, when questions of inter-
pretation arise, courts must consider
the FTC's interpretations of the appro-
priate antitrust provision. The court
found that the FTC decisions clearly
showed an intent to regulate both the
actual and the business practice ofmedi-
cine, thereby supporting a more expan-
sive coverage of professional organi-
zations than that under the Act.
In response, SMH and Newman fur-
ther asserted that Congress actually
intended to treat contracts for medical
services differently than ordinary com-
mercial contracts. The court, however,
refused to recognize such a distinction
since the issue concerned the commer-
cial effect of the contract and its impact
on consumers in the community.
Patients Deceived by Undisclosed
Kickback Scheme
In their second argument, SMH and
Newman stated that even if the ar-
rangement constituted an unfair trade
practice, Gadson failed to show that the
agreement deceived consumers, the
second requirement of the Act. The
court disagreed, finding that the al-
leged "kickback scheme," where
Newman's Clinic received a fee for
each patient admitted to the SMH pro-
gram, amounted to deceptive trade prac-
tices.
The court found Newman's prac-
tices deceptive for two reasons. First,
relying on Illinois case law, the court
stated that SMH and Newman had an
obligation to affirmatively disclose the
kickback arrangement to theirpatients.
The court refused to accept their argu-
ment that the $90 fee was not a kick-
back, but was instead compensation for
medical services rendered by Newman's
doctors. Regardless of whether the $90
amounted to compensation, absent any
evidence from SMH or Newman that
they provided the patients with infor-
mation about the arrangement, the court
held that the kickback arrangement
deceived health care consumers.
Secondly, the court held that the
arrangement increased costs to health
care consumers as a result of the decep-
tive practices it encouraged. The court
focused on studies showing that finan-
cial incentives, such as kickback ar-
rangements, prompted doctors to arti-
ficially exploit the demand for health
care in order to increase revenue. The
court reasoned that exploitation of con-
sumers under the SMH/Newman ar-
rangement could occur through unwar-
ranted extended hospitalization and
other unnecessary inpatient treatment.
The court concluded that Gadson's
allegations of deceptive trade prac-
tices, which injured medical consum-
ers and other competing health care
providers in the area, were within the
jurisdiction of the Act. Accordingly,
the court denied SMH and Newman's
motion to dismiss and ruled that Gadson
could file suit and attempt to claim
relief against SMH and Newman's
Clinic under the Act. 40,
- Laura M. Zubor
Federal Medicare Law
Does Not Preempt State
Regulation of HMOs
In Solorzano v. Family Health Plan
Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (Cal.App.
1992), the California Court of Appeals
held that the federal statute and regula-
tions governing the marketing prac-
tices of Medicare-qualified health main-
tenance organizations did not preempt
state unfair business practice and con-
sumer protection statutes.
What a Deal
Ada Solorzano, America Rodriguez,
and Dolores Morales ("Patients") agreed
to assign their federal Medicare and
state Medi-Cal benefits to Family Health
Plan ("FHP"), a health maintenance
organization ("HMO") that conducted
a coordinated care plan for Medicare
beneficiaries. FHP agents assured the
individuals that they could continue to
see their own doctors, who did not
participate in the plan, for a "nominal"
fee. In fact, however, FHP allowed use
of non-participating doctors only in
emergencies. Except in these instances,
the doctors either turned away the pa-
tient or billed them in full for the
services.
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The Patients consequently with-
drew from the FHP plan and sued.
They claimed that the HMO's prac-
tices violated both California civil
code provisions against deceptive
practices in consumer transactions
and the state business and profes-
sional code. The three individuals
sought to enjoin the FHP's alleg-
edly deceptive trade practices. They
further requested general and puni-
tive damages for fraud and inten-
tional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. In response, FHP argued that
the court should dismiss the claims
because federal Medicare statute
and regulations controlled, and
therefore the case belonged in fed-
eral, not state court. The trial court
granted FHP's motion to dismiss,
and the Patients appealed.
The Medicare Regime
Medicare, a federal health insurance
program primarily for the aged, pays
most benefits through a traditional fee-
for-service arrangement. In this ar-
rangement, doctors and hospitals send
bills for services rendered directly to
Medicare. Additionally, HMOs and
other coordinated care plans provide
all services covered by Medicare, and
sometimes more, at little or no added
cost. However, in these programs,
beneficiaries forfeit the right to seek
care from outside doctors and hospi-
tals.
The Health Insurance for the Aged
Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq. (the "Medi-
care Act") governs Medicare. The
section governing the relationship be-
tween Medicare and health plans, such
as HMOs, authorizes the Health Care
Financing Administration (the "Ad-
ministration") to set rules and proce-
dures for enrolling Medicare benefi-
ciaries. The Administration must also
review and approve all promotional
materials used by health plans. Plans
that misrepresent or falsify informa-
tion provided to any individual are
subject to civil fines.
The federal regulations covering
Medicare and coordinated health plans
require such plans to provide basic
explanations of benefits, eligibility re-
quirements, non-covered services, and
other information beneficiaries need to
make informed choices. The section of
the regulations that covers marketing
activities specifically prohibits: (1)
unethical practices; (2) activities that
might mislead, confuse, or defraud
potential beneficiaries; (3) use of pay-
ments as an inducement to enroll; and
(4) making of promises that materially
alter the marketing material informa-
tion submitted to the Administration.
Plea for Preemption
FHP presented two arguments for
the dismissal of the suit. First, it
argued that the Medicare Act and regu-
lations effectively preempted the Cali-
fornia Health Care Service Plan Act.
Alternatively, FHP argued that state
court injunctions against certain HMO
marketing practices created potential
conflicts with federal regulations.
Addressing the preemption argu-
ment, the court noted that Congress
historically preempted state regulatory
authority in two ways. Congress either
explicitly stated its intent to preempt or
created statutes and regulations so com-
prehensive and pervasive that it effec-
tively precluded state supplement.
Nowhere in the Medicare Act, the court
stated, did Congress expressly state an
intent to preclude state regulation.
Furthermore, the court concluded that
Congress did not intend to implicitly
preempt state authority over health plan
marketing. Rather, the court found that
the regulations and Act are "neither
particularly extensive nor particularly
detailed," leaving states ample room to
supplement them. The court also noted
that in areas other than health plan
marketing, courts have consistently
rejected the argument that the federal
Medicare regulations are pervasive
enough to preempt state authority.
Even viewing the federal health plan
marketing rules as comprehensive, the
court found that they would not pre-
empt state authority. The court gave
two reasons for this conclusion-one
statutory, the other historical. In the
Medicare Act, the court stated, Con-
gress expressed its intent to minimize
federal intrusion into Medicare admin-
istration. The court also noted that
public health regulation historically has
been a state police power.
Next, the court considered the con-
tention that California's regulation of
health plan marketing was invalid be-
cause it could potentially conflict with
federal regulation. The court rejected
this argument on two grounds. First,
the court asserted that states may set
tougher penalties or standards of proof
than required by federal law without
precluding federal regulation. Second,
federal law will preempt state law only
if compliance with both state and fed-
eral rules is a "physical impossibility"
or when the state law creates an ob-
stacle to the goals of Congress. The
court concluded that neither condition
existed in this case. Instead, the state
and federal regulatory schemes were
found to be "strikingly similar" sys-
tems working together to prevent mis-
representations and other unfair prac-
tices by Medicare-qualified health plans.
In fact, the court pointed out that the
Administration directed Medicare-
qualified HMOs to follow state and
local marketing rules.
The court offered one final argu-
ment against preemption. It noted that
Congress amended the Medicare stat-
ute as recently as 1990. At that time,
Congress was presumably aware that
some states, such as California, regu-
lated HMO marketing practices. How-
ever, the 1990 amendments contained
no specific preemption terms. The
court found that because Congress was
silent about preemption of state laws it
knew existed, it did not intend to dis-
place them.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed
the California trial court, holding that
states could regulate Medicare-quali-
fied health plans to protect consumers
without violating either the Medicare
Act or its implementing regulations. o.*o
- Timothy Stanton
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